Bank regulators are concerned with the dramatic increase and risk exposure of Off-Balance Sheet (OBS) banking activities in recent years, and proposed that some OBS activities be included in the calculation of a risk-based capital requirement. This paper investigates the riskiness of OBS activities. Specifically, this paper reports on three capital market tests of OBS banking risk: the impact of OBS activities on the risk-premia of subordinated debt, on equity risk and on systematic risk of large commercial banks and bank holding companies. The underlying premise of this study is that the bank stockholders and subordinated debtholders are more exposed to the risk of bank failure resulting from OBS banking risk than insured and uninsured depositholders. If aBS activities are significantly related to market measures of bank risk, then "market discipline" of such activities exists. The empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of CBS banking risk on the default risk-premia borne by subordinated debt holders. The results indicate that most aBS activities reduce risk premia and equity risk, but do not affect systematic risk. Both stockholders and subordinated debtholders price these aBS activities as risk-reducing. Therefore, regulatory interference in the form of additional capital requirement of aBS activities will penalize large commercial banks and will create distortions in the financial intermediation market.
I. Introduction
Bank regulators are concerned with the dramatic increase in off-balance sheet (OBS) banking activities in recent years. Off-balance sheet activities are not summarized in dollars on the balance sheet but are instead given in the verbal footnotes to balance sheets. Ho,{ever, banks are required to report such activities to regulatory authorities. In off-balance sheet transactions, banks earn fee incomes instead of interest spreads, and loans are not held on the books.
As a result of these OBS activities, banks may face three general types of portfolio risk: credit risk on underwritten guarantees, interest rate risk due to liability mismatches on commitment takedmms and liquidity risk due to overextension of obligations. Unlike balance sheet items, these potential obligations are not funded with balance sheet liabilities and are not considered in determining a bank's regulatory capital requirements. On March 1, 1988, the Federal Reserve, in conjunction ,{ith other bank regulatory agencies and foreign central banks issued a risk-based capital proposal, which will be phased in by 1992, that some off-balance sheet items be included in calculating such a capital requirement.
A key rationale for OBS banking capital regulation is an assumed information asymmetry between bank managers and liability holders. The regulatory presumption is that such ODS activities are risky and the market fails to recognize the risk embodied in such ODS activities. The "market discipline'! studies of ODS banking risk have addressed the question of whether market prices of bank liabilities reflect the risk of ODS activities. If "market discipline" exists and off-balance sheet activities are found to be risk-sensitive, bank liability holders can distinguish ODS banking risk. The assumed information asymmetry rationale for capital regulation of OBS activities, therefore, becomes less convincing.
The purpose of this paper is to rigorously explore the riskiness and motivation of OBS banking activities. This research reports on three capital market tests of OBS banking risk: the impact of OBS activities on the risk-premia of subordinated debt, on equity risk and on systematic risk of large commercial banks and bank holding companies. This research improves upon the existing evidence of OBS banking risk in three important \.;ays. First, ,..hile the relationships betHeen OBS activities and, total and systematic risks have been studied, the empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of OBS risk on the default-risk premia borne by subordinated debt-holders. Second, this paper examines the riskiness of all 19 OBS items --categorized into seven groups depending upon their similar characteristics --from call and income reports of the FDIC tapes. Third, this study employs an etended data set ranging from 1984 to 1988. A pooled cross-section and time-series generalized least squares (GLS) estimation procedure is employed to examine the "market discipline" of OBS activities. The underlying premise of this study is that the bank stockholders and subordinated debtholders are more exposed to the risk of bank failure than depositholders. Therefore, their assessment of the riskiness of OBS activities is realistically determined.
II. Previous Research
The theoretical analysis of OBS banking activities primarily deals \.;ith the motivation and existence of such activities. The overriding conclusions of theoretical analyses are that (1) OBS activities are natural banking activities, and hence do not affect business risk of banking firms, (2) OBS activities provide diversification potential to bank stockholders, and hence reduce total risk but do not affect systematic risk, (3) OBS activities are potentially leverage increasing, and hence increase financial risk.
A number of competing hypotheses concerning risk-taking behavior of OBS items have been proposed in literature. A bank's activity in the market for off-balance sheet credit enhancement is a function of its willingness to accommodate the needs of its customers, the market's perception of bank's quality as reflected in balance sheet decisions and the incentives provided by the regulators. Theories of financial intermediation suggest that OBS banking activities are designed to provide credit enhancement services to its customers.
By guaranteeing funds availability, the intermediary has an incentive to efficiently monitor the borrowers, produce information and signal its credibility, and specialize in credit evaluation. OBS banking activities thus represent substitute methods for allocating credit with complementaries in production. The risk-return trade-off between saving information services and warehousing assets will induce a bank to divide its business bet,{een both balance and off-balance sheet financial activities. Therefore, OBS activities do not affect fundamental business risk of banking firms. Because part of business risk is diversifiable, the remaining market risk is also unaffected by OBS activities. The diversification hypothesis implies that banks engage in OBS activities to diversify its asset portfolio in order to achieve within firm diversification and to avoid the wrath of disappointed bank shareholders [see Diamond (1984) , Pavel (1987 Pavel ( , 1988 J. Vithin-firrn bank risk is reduced by low correlation of OBS activities with other bank asset activities. ~Iarket risk of OBS activities is determined by diversification within banking firm and by stockholders. Therefore, part of diversifiable risk of bankfs total risk is eliminated by bank's \Jithin-firm diversification potential of ODS activities, and part is eliminated by diversified stockholders in their mm portfolios.
This hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between total bank risk and OilS activities.
The Leverage Hypothesis states that fixed rate deposit insurance together with capital requirements provide incentives to increase financial leverage through the issuance of OBS activities that are not subject to capital requirements. By increasing financial leverage in this way, a bank can enhance whatever subsidies it receives from deposit insurance. This hypothesis thus predicts a positive relationship between total bank risk and OilS activities .[see Pyle (1985) , Benveniste and Berger (1986) ].
The Collaterization and Underinvestment Hypothesis states that SLCs and loan sales, two OBS items, are substitutes for collaterized debt claims because banks are prohibited from issuing collaterized deposits. Loan sales and SLCs have payoff characteristics similar to secured debt. Like secured debt, these off-balance activities permit banks to sell a portion of cash-flo\Js associated with ne\J investment opportunities. The ability to engage in off-balance sheet activities, therefore, permits banks to invest in loans with positive net present value that they would pass up if restricted to deposit financing.
Capital requirements, which limit bank leverage, intensifies the under investment problem by restricting a bank's ability to offset reductions in bank asset risk with increases in financial leverage. Fixed rate deposit insurance premium increases the underinvestment problem because rates paid on bank deposits do not reflect the marginal contribution of a neli investment to the risk of bank1s portfolio of assets. The underinvestment problem is likely to be greater if the bank has riskier deposits and higher capital requirements. Therefore, the amount of SLCs and Loan Sales are expected to be positively related to riskiness of banks [see James (1988) A study by Beighly, Boyd and Jacobs (1975) examined the relationship between financial leverage and stock price for 113 bank holding companies for the periods 1972 through 1974. They used the average level of the common stock price (three month average) as a dependent variable. They found that dividends, earnings gro\,1th, firm size and loan loss rate were the most important determinants of the market prices of bank equities. They also found that for the given sample of bank holding companies, the higher a bank's degree of financial leverage at a point in time, the lower is the bank's stock price (after controlling for bank size, earnings gro\{th, dividends and loan losses). Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) investigated the relationship bet\{een financial policies of commercial banks and two market determined measures of risk. Accounting data measures of financial leverage, liquidity, dividend payout ratio, loan loss experience and variability in earnings and deposits are used.
These are related to a measure of systematic risk (beta) and total risk (standard deviation of equity return), also calculated for the same five-year period. Bivariate and multivariate relationships are examined. As independent variables used to explain beta, the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, variability of deposits and the loan to deposit ratio are significant. In explaining total risk the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, a financial leverage measure, variability of deposits and earnings, a loan loss measure and a liquidity measure are all significant. Baer and Bre\{er (1986) regressed CD rates over quarterly measures of bank accounting risk variables for a sample of 37 banks over the time period 1979-82.
They present evidence that bank CD rates are strongly affected by accounting based measures of bank risk-taking. The market for large, uninsured CDs helps discipline bank risk-t~{ing by penalizing risky banks with a higher CD risk premium. Baer and Brewer study (1985) supports the conclusions of another study by Hannan and Han\{eck (1988) that employs survey data on CD rates for five different maturities and finds that CD risk premiums increase \{ith both the ratio of risky assets to capital and uncertainty regarding bank returns on assets.
Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988) conducted a cross-section study of subordinated debt pricing for both 1983 and 1984. Subordinated debt is junior to uninsured CDs so that its pricing ought to show clear responses to risk measures. HOwever, examining the spread over the comparable treasury yields these authors were unable to demonstrate the effect of any balance sheet or income statement data on bank costs. They also conclude that implicit insurance of a bank debt is not a consistent explanation for the lack of correlation bet'veen default premia and on-balance accounting measures of risk because there is significant variation of risk premia across banks in the sample.
Although none of these studies include OBS banking risk variables, these studies show the appropriateness of accounting-based risk models in analyzing the impact of OBS banking activities on bank risk measures.
Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies (1985) explain CD rates as function of the general level of interest rates and various measures of bank risk including
SLCs. Accounting risk variables used are loan-loss reserve position, net income ratio, interest sensitive liabilities, capital over risky assets and SLCs over risky assets. The effects of bank's SLC exposure on CD rate is treated as having t'vo components: a leverage effect (the ratio of bank capital to risky assets including loans and SLCs) and a credit quality effect (the ratio of SLCs to risky assets, to allo,v for differences in credit quality of the loan and SLC portfolios). Based on this model, they found that CD rates rose with increasing leverage and fell with increases in SLCs as a proportion of total risky assets.
Since these t,vo factors tend to cancel each other, the net effect on bank risk of an increase in bank's SLC exposure apparently is negligible. The inclusion of SLC as a ratio of total risky assets did not improve the explanatory power of this model. They explain this to be due to the capital/loan variable that impounds both the beneficial impacts of SLCs on credit quality and the adverse impact of SLCs on capital exposure. Their study also found that, despite higher credit quality, increasing SLCs did not reduce bank risk.
Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson (1986) use an empirical method based on a version of CAP~1 that estimates systematic risk associated with various components of a bank's income statement, balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities. In a time-series, cross-sectional analysis of 63 bank holding companies for 1983-84 with a two factor CAPJl, it is found that equity market prices SLCs but not loan commitments or commercial letters of credit. Moreover, SLCs are priced as risk-reducing, not risk-increasing activity of banks by well-diversified shareholders. The second factor used in CAP~I is a value-weighted banking industry stock market index. The regulatory implication of this study IS that (1) loan commitments and commercial letters of credit are not perceived as risk-increasing activities for banks and that their inclusion Table 3 provides the coefficient estimates of a basic risk-premia model.
Analysis of Results
Seven equations were estimated, one for each off-balance sheet group, using Table 4 presents estimates of the explanatory variables using standard deviation of equity return (SIG~IAE) as the dependent variable. Off-balance sheet items constitute a heterogeneous collection of participations, commitments, and other arrangements. Therefore, it is difficult to represent the influence of these items in any simple way. The off-balance sheet variables are grouped into seven classes according to their similar characteristics. All off-balance sheet variables possess negative coefficients. One of these coefficients is significant at the 1% level (ASLC), four are significant at the 57. level (AOB, ACOJDI, AACLC, AOBS) and one is significant at the 1% level (AS'iAP). The coefficient of APART is not significantly different from zero.
These results suggest that at least some of the off-balance sheet variables are risk-reducing. These results support the findings of Lynge and Lee (1987) that off-balance sheet items reduce total risk.
The hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification potential of OBS items dominates the risk-increasing potential of OBS items can be tested by comparing is also highly correlated with off-balance measures of risk, perhaps pointing towards a simultaneity between size and off-balance sheet items. These results are, however, consistent with previous studies of market-determined and accounting-determined measures of bank risk variables (Pettway, 1976). Table 5 presents estimates of explanatory variables using BETA as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficients of all OBS items have expected negative signs, and all but one are not statistically significant. These results suggest that most OBS activities have no effect on systematic bank r~sk.
The results are consistent with Pettway (1976) and Lynge and Lee (1987) . are expected to affect mostly specific risk rather than systematic risk.
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The primary purpose of this paper has been to examine whether "market implying that off-balance sheet risk is not a concern of well-diversified stockholders. ,nlile bank regulators are concerned with total risk and the probability of bank failures, the risk reducing potential of OBS activities indicates that additional capital requirement of DBS banking activities will penalize large banks.
There is clear evidence of a "market discipline" of DBS banking risk.
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